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Health Insurance Trends in Interest Arbitration
by Gary Bailey
I. Introduction
Under the bargaining impasse provisions of the Illinois Public Labor
Relations Act (IPLRA),1 employees
designated as security employees,
peace officers, firefighters and paramedics are prohibited from withholding services as a method to resolve
issues that are deadlocked in collective
bargaining negotiations.2 Instead,
these essential service employees must
submit unresolved issues to statutory
interest arbitration. A neutral arbitrator is empowered to select the more
favorable of the parties’ final proposals
concerning the disputed provisions of
the labor agreement by using the
specific factors set forth in IPLRA.3
Since February 1986, the Illinois
Labor Relations Board (ILRB) has
documented the issuance of over 300
interest arbitration awards between
Illinois public employers and the
unions representing their employees.4
These interest arbitration awards
cover a myriad of mandatory subjects
of bargaining, including economic
issues (e.g., wages, insurance, vacations, hours of work and overtime,
vacations, holidays, sick leave) and
non-economic issues (e.g., residency,
shift bidding, physical fitness testing,
disciplinary appeal procedures, seniority).
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Many articles have been written
about the evolution of interest
arbitration in Illinois and how interest
arbitrators have interpreted and
applied the statutory factors to resolve
these bargaining impasses.5 A review
of interest awards reveals that one of
the cornerstones in interest arbitration is that arbitrators view the
process as promoting conservative
results. From the outset, arbitrators
have expressed favor in maintaining
the status quo, which was likely
established by way of mutual
agreement. Where one party is
proposing to depart from the status
quo, interest arbitrators impose a
burden to show the special circumstances necessary to impose a new
benefit, a new procedure or changes to
existing procedures on the parties.6
Arguably, the legacy of these
arbitration awards created a level of
predictability and conservatism in the
bargaining process. In practical
terms, the awards serve as advice to a
party at the bargaining table seeking
changes to existing provisions that it
will bear a serious burden to show that
its proposed change is more than just
“a good idea.”7 Furthermore, the
awards serve as support for a party
attempting to maintain the status quo
as to the reasonableness of its position
in the face of demands for change.
Inject into this conservative world
of collective bargaining the recent
escalation of health insurance costs.
Over the past five years, employers
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and employees wait with baited breath
to hear from their insurance companies about increases to premiums,
deductibles, out of pocket costs and
prescription drug cards, with corresponding decreases in benefits and
coverage. Faced with these rising
costs, public employers have turned to
their employees and sought increases
in employee contributions. Not surprisingly, public employees (like their
employers) have sought to limit their
exposure to the unpredictable liability
of medical and prescription drug bills.
As public employers and the unions
representing their employees struggled
at the bargaining table to reach
agreement, impasses inevitably occurred and the parties turned to
interest arbitration to resolve their
disputes. Is the unusual upheaval in
the health insurance industry cause
for abandoning the conservative model
of reviewing interest arbitration
issues? Have arbitrators turned their
backs to maintaining the status quo in
the face of this crisis? This article
explores the interest arbitration
awards issued over the past two years
that addressed the issue of health
insurance contributions and examines
how arbitrators have analyzed this
issue in the face of unprecedented cost
escalation.

II. Background
The IPLRA went into effect on July 1,
1984.8 Although the law contained a
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provision for interest arbitration for
“security employees,”9 the provisions
of the new collective bargaining law
expressly excluded peace officers and
fire fighters from its coverage. In
1985, however, the IPLRA was
amended to include peace officers and
fire fighters, and the amendment
provided that bargaining impasses for
both employee groups were to be
resolved through the existing interest
arbitration process set forth in Section
14.10
Section 14 of the IPRLA governs the
interest arbitration process. The
process provides for evidentiary
hearings to be conducted by a
tripartite panel, consisting of a
delegate chosen by the union, a
delegate chosen by the public employer
and a neutral chairman chosen by
mutual selection.11 The chairman12
has the authority to require the
attendance of witnesses, to administer
oaths, to order the productions of
documents and records, to see that
verbatim record of the proceedings is
made, and even to remand the dispute
for further collective bargaining.13
The Chairman must initially
determine whether the unresolved
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issues are economic or non-economic
in nature and set forth a time by which
the parties must announce and
provide their final offers.14 If an issue
is economic in nature, the Chairman
must adopt one of the party’s final
offers on the issue; however, if an issue
is non-economic in nature, the
Chairman may either adopt one of the
party’s final offers or order an entirely
different result.15 In either event, the
Chairman must make his determination as the appropriate resolution
based upon the factors found in Section
14(h).
Section 14(h) provides:
. . . [T]he arbitration panel shall
base its findings, opinions, and
order upon the following factors, as
applicable:
(1) The lawful authority of the
employer.
(2) Stipulations of the parties.
(3) The interests and welfare of the
public and the financial ability of
the unit of government to meet
those costs.
(4) Comparison of the wages,
hours and conditions of employment of the employees involved in
the arbitration proceeding with
the wages, hours and conditions of
employment of other employees
performing similar services and
with other employees generally:
(A) In public employment in
comparable communities.
(B) In private employment in
comparable communities.
(5) The average consumer prices
for goods and services, commonly
known as the cost of living.
(6) The overall compensation
presently received by the employees, including direct wage compensation, vacations, holidays and
other excused time, insurance and
pensions, medical and hospitalization benefits, the continuity and
stability of employment and all
other benefits received.
(7) Changes in any of the following
circumstances during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings.
(8) Such other factors, not confined
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to the foregoing, which are normally or traditionally taken into
consideration in the determination
of wages, hours and conditions of
employment through voluntary
collective bargaining, mediation,
fact-finding, arbitration or otherwise between the parties, in the
public service or in private
employment.16
The Chairman must issue a written
award within thirty days after the
conclusion of the hearing. The governing body of the public employer has
twenty days to reject the award; the
union membership has no internal
right of acceptance or rejection17 If the
public employer’s governing body
rejects all or some of the award, the
matter is remanded to the same
Chairman for reconsideration.18 The
public employer, however, is responsible for the reasonable costs of the
supplemental proceeding, including
the union’s attorney’s fees.19
Arbitration awards are reviewable
in circuit court.20 The criterion by
which a circuit court may reverse an
interest arbitration award is severely
limited.21 If the circuit court affirms
the award of money, rejecting the
public employer’s court appeal, the
public employer is charged 12 percent
per annum interest on the award if the
award is retroactive.22

III. The Increase in Health
Insurance Costs
In 2006, employers across the nation
are expected to pay an increase of
9.9 percent for health insurance
premiums.23 This is relatively good
news considering the past few years.
In 2002, costs rose 11.2 percent;24 in
2003, costs rose 14.7 percent;25 in
2004, costs rose 12.3 percent;26 and in
2005, costs rose 11.3 percent.27 This
cumulative increase of 59.4 percent
over five years unquestionably demonstrates that the increased costs
associated with medical care and
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insurance have significantly outgrown increases to wages and in the
cost-of-living.28
In 2006, the portion of health
insurance premiums paid by employers will reach $8,046 per employee,
and the portion paid by employees will
rise to $1,612 per employee.29 On
average, workers will pay more than
$134 per month for their health
insurance premiums, which is more
than double what they paid five years
ago.30 Additionally, out-of-pocket costs
for co-payments, drugs and other noncovered expenses are expected to rise
11 percent, to $1,524 a year.31 Thus,
in 2006, employees will be paying over
$3,000 for medical costs covered and
not covered by their insurance plan.32
In 2000, employees paid about 16
percent of health insurance premiums.33 By 2006, that number should
increase to 20 percent.34 An employee
earning an annual salary of $40,000
who receives a 3.0 percent wage
increase ($1,200), will use more 25
percent of the wage increase ($326) to
pay for the increase in health
insurance premiums and out-ofpocket costs.35 Furthermore, the
employee earning an annual salary of
$40,000 and paying over $3,000 in
annual medical costs is dedicating 7.5
percent of gross salary (i.e., the salary
prior to taxation) to health insurance
and out-of-pocket medical costs.
In Chicago, the numbers are worse.
In 2006, Chicago-area employees will
pay an average annual sum of $1,707
for their share of health insurance
premiums and about $1,549 for out-ofpocket costs.36 The Chicago-area
employee will therefore pay over
$3,200 in 2006 for medical costs
covered and not covered by their
insurance plan.
How do these numbers translate to
a labor negotiator? Both union and
management negotiators try to prevent their clients from having to bear
the brunt of these increases by having
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their adversaries accept a greater
share of these costs. Both parties have
compelling reasons why their clients
have already borne a sufficient share
of the burdens of increasing medical
costs. Both parties, at the mercy of
insurance companies and pharmaceutical giants, see their economic
condition being worn down without
hope for escape and with little or no
control over the situation.
These facts bear out only one simple
conclusion: the increase in health
insurance costs have caused a crisis
for those involved in collective
bargaining.

IV. The Cases 37
During 2004 and 2005, the Illinois
Labor Relations Board reports that
thirty-nine interest arbitration awards
issued.38 Of the sixteen interest
arbitration awards issued in 2004,
only six dealt with health insurance
contributions. Of the twenty-three
interest arbitration awards issued in
2005, only eleven dealt with health
insurance contributions.
A. The Cases of Import
Of the seventeen interest arbitration
awards issued over the past two years
that addressed the issue of health
insurance contributions, eleven fully
explored the competing interests
between public employers and their
employees regarding paying for health
insurance coverage. The cases are
discussed below.
1. County of Lee and Sheriff of Lee
County and Illinois Fraternal Order
of Police Labor Council39
The union and the county arbitrated the contract covering three
units of employees: the deputies; the
corrections officers; and supervisory/
administrative personnel.40 Regarding the issue of health insurance, the
union sought to limit the county’s
existing contractual right to raise the
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employees’ insurance contributions by
eliminating the following language in
the existing health insurance article:
In the event the Employer finds it
necessary to require additional
payments from employees for
insurance, it will do so in the same
manner and in the same amounts
as charged to all non-represented
County employees.41
During the term of the last contract,
the county had experienced large
increases in health insurance and
exercised its contractual right by
passing on large premium increases to
the bargaining unit of deputies and
corrections officers.
The union argued that the cost of
health insurance had increased so
substantially that altering the county’s
authority regarding contributions was
not out of line or unreasonable under
the circumstances. The union wanted
to prevent future mid-term increases
and by bargaining specific employee
contribution levels that would remain
constant throughout the term of the
agreement.42
The arbitrator found in favor of the
county.43 The arbitrator placed on the
union the burden to justify its
proposed change.44 The arbitrator held
that merely because the county was
exercising the right to pass along midterm premium increases to the
bargaining unit did not mean that the
existing language was “broken.”45
Although the external comparables
supported the union’s offer, the
arbitrator was convinced that the
current language, which had been in
existence for fourteen years, should
not be changed suddenly merely
because it was now (for the first time)
being used in the manner in which the
parties had agreed.46
With respect to premium contributions, the union proposed an increase
of over $1,200 for single coverage and
over $1,500 for family coverage for the
term of the contract.47 The county
proposed larger increases, including
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raising the deductible for single
coverage to $1,000.48
The Arbitrator adopted the county’s
insurance proposal regarding contributions, which matched the levels the
county had implemented for other
employee groups. The arbitrator remarked that insurance was “a
nightmare and at a crisis level,” 49 and
the County was merely proposing the
contributions levels that it had the
right to implement under the
agreement.50
2. Village of Wilmette and Local 73,
Service Employees International
Union51
The union sought interest arbitration to resolve the first collective
bargaining agreement for the village’s
firefighters. After sixteen days of
hearing, spread over nineteen months,
the arbitrator issued this award,
covering thirty-one issues.
With respect to health insurance,
the arbitrator compared the two
comprehensive proposals and determined that the most distinctive
difference between the parties’ proposals was the union’s demand that the
village create a Medical Reimbursement Account insurance plan. The
arbitrator noted that the union’s offer
was “both novel and creative . . .”.52
The arbitrator adopted the village’s
offer based somewhat upon internal
and external comparability, but also
based on the fact that the union’s offer
was a departure from the ordinary
which had not been thoroughly
negotiated between the parties.53
3. City of Mt. Vernon and Illinois
Fraternal Order of Police Labor
Council54
The union, representing the city’s
police officers, sought interest arbitration to resolve the impasse in
negotiations. One of the issues between the parties that remained
unresolved was health insurance
contributions.
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The city sought a “breakthrough”
by requiring the employees to
contribute to the cost of premiums for
single health insurance. The existing
agreement provided that the city paid
100 percent of the premiums for single
coverage but the employee paid 100
percent of the premium for family
coverage. The union sought no changes
to the contributions levels while the
city proposed that employees contribute up to $55 per month depending
upon the cost of premium assessed to
the city.55
The city argued that the cost of
health insurance had increased
substantially so that asking the
employees to make some contribution
was reasonable under the circumstances. It further asserted that the
national trend strongly supported
employees sharing the cost of
individual health insurance coverage.56
The arbitrator rejected the city’s
breakthrough and adopted the union’s
final offer. The arbitrator noted that
external comparability and overall
compensation, as well as bargaining
history, supported the union.57 The
arbitrator acknowledged that the
city’s costs had increased and that
national trends supported the city’s
position; however, the arbitrator found
these factors less persuasive than the
statutory factors supporting the
union’s final offer.58
4. County of Effingham and the
Sheriff of Effingham County and
AFSCME Council 3159
An impasse was reached covering
a county bargaining unit of corrections
officers and telecommunicators.
Among the issues was health
insurance.
With regard to health insurance,
the union sought to maintain the
status quo whereby the county paid
100 percent of the health insurance
premiums for single coverage. The
county proposed that it pay the first
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$350.00 of the health insurance
monthly premiums for single coverage
and that the county and the employee
evenly divide premium costs in excess
of $350.00 per month with a dollar cap
on employee contributions.60
The arbitrator adopted the county’s
final offer. The arbitrator noted that a
strong majority of the external
comparables paid 100 percent of the
insurance premiums for single coverage notwithstanding national trends.61
However, the arbitrator noted that the
sworn deputy unit had recently agreed
to the county’s health insurance
proposal.62 Further, the cost-of-living
favored the county’s offer.63
5. City of Pekin and Illinois
Fraternal Order of Police Labor
Council64
The union representing the city’s
police officers filed for interest
arbitration after an impasse was
reached. With regard to health insurance, the city sponsored a self-funded
plan, paying 100 percent for single
coverage while employees paid $25 per
month for family coverage.65 The city
had begun to eliminate the plan,
moving other unionized employees to a
new plan with new cost-sharing
requirements.66
The city proposed that employees
pay $25 per month for single coverage
and that the employees share equally
with the city in increases to premiums
for family insurance, up to a cap of $75
per month.67 The union proposed for
the city to offer both the new plan and
the old plan, with breakthrough dollar
contributions for both single and
family coverage.68
The arbitrator noted that the
city’s proposal would “significantly
increase employee health insurance
costs,” 69 but found the proposal
reasonable in light of strong internal
comparability.70 The arbitrator noted
that although the union proposal
contained concessions, they were
insufficient to address the problems
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experienced by the city.71 The external
comparables did not establish support
for either party.72 The arbitrator
awarded the cty’s final offer on health
insurance.73
6. City of Highwood and Metropolitan Alliance of Police, Highwood
Chapter 105 74
The first contract between the city
and the union representing the city’s
police officers and police sergeants was
advanced to interest arbitration. The
parties gave the Arbitrator authority
to bifurcate the issue of single and
family health insurance.75
The union sought to eliminate the
existing employee contributions for
both single and family coverage.76 The
city sought to maintain the existing 20
percent employee contribution for
single coverage and 50 percent
contribution for family coverage.77
The arbitrator found in favor of
the union regarding single coverage.
The arbitrator found that requiring 20
percent employee contributions for
single coverage was out of line with the
external comparables and that the
additional cost to the city was not
oppressive.78 The arbitrator also took
into consideration his wage determination in arriving at this decision.79
However, the arbitrator found that
requiring employees to pay 50 percent
of the premium for family coverage
was not out of line with the
comparables.80
7. City of Elgin and Local 439,
IAFF 81
The union, representing the city’s
firefighters, and the city proceeded to
interest arbitration to resolve an
impasse over eight issues. The previous contract between the parties did
not require the firefighters to make
any contributions toward health
insurance premiums.
The city proposed that employees
pay 7.5 percent toward either single or
family health insurance coverage,
effective the second year of the
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contract. The city proposed to increase
this level to 8.5 percent in the third
year of the contract. The union
proposed employees pay $10 per pay
period for single coverage and $15 per
pay period for family coverage,
effective the second year of the
contract. The union proposed to
increase these contributions to $15 per
pay period for single coverage and $25
per pay period for family coverage in
the third year of the contract.82
The arbitrator adopted the city’s
proposal. The arbitrator found that the
city’s proposed contribution levels
would be the lowest among the
external comparables. The arbitrator
noted that the city had bargained the
same level of contributions for the
police unit and for two other units for
the second year of the contract.
Although the union correctly asserted
that the city’s increase in the third
year would require the firefighters to
contribute more than any other
employee group, the union’s offer
would result in the firefighters paying
less than all other employees. The
Arbitrator thus found that the city’s
offer was closer to internal consistency
than the offer made by the union.83
8. Village of Carpentersville and
Metropolitan Alliance of Police,
Chapter 378 84
The union that represented the
village’s police officers proceeded to
interest arbitration. The previous
contract between the parties required
the police officers to contribute $5 per
month for single health insurance
coverage and $40 per month for family
coverage.85
The union proposed to increase
contributions to health insurance
premiums to $40 per month for single
coverage and $80 per month for family
coverage.86 The village proposed to
change the contributions from a dollar
system to a percentage system. Under
the village’s offer, the employees would
pay 20 percent of the monthly health
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insurance premiums for either single
or family coverage. 87
The arbitrator voiced a preference
for “percentage-based” systems, but
adopted the union’s final offer after
agonizing over the extreme nature of
the facts.88 The arbitrator noted that
the employees have “long enjoyed an
almost cost free insurance benefit,”
and that the village was in need for
“catch up.”89 The arbitrator also found
that the majority of the comparable
communities had percentage-based
contribution levels.90
But, after examining the external
comparables, the arbitrator found that
the village’s offer would result in the
police officers now paying more for
insurance than municipal officers in
adjacent communities. 91 The arbitrator noted that the village’s proposal
would have the effect of the employees
paying almost $75 per month for single
coverage and almost $180 per month
for family coverage.92 Due significantly to the extreme size of the
increase proposed by the village, the
arbitrator found that the union’s final
offer was more reasonable.93
9.Village of Bolingbrook and
Metropolitan Alliance of Police,
Bolingbrook Command Chapter 9 94
The union and the village proceeded
to interest arbitration over one issue:
health insurance. The contract was
the first for the city’s police sergeants
and police lieutenants. The unit
personnel had previously paid no
premium for single health insurance
coverage and $45 per month for family
health insurance coverage.
The village proposed a matrix for
premium contributions at the levels
that all other village employees, except
for the police officer unit, enjoyed. The
matrix included ten options which
provided that employees may choose
between a variety of plans with
different premium co-pays and corresponding deductibles and benefits.
The union proposed the status quo
for health insurance contributions
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until the award issued, followed by
increasing contributions to the same
levels the rank-and-file officers (also
represented in collective bargaining)
had to pay, which were $30 per month
for single coverage and $60 per month
for family coverage. These contribution levels were the result of an
interest arbitration award, wherein
the arbitrator rejected the village’s
offer to apply the same health
insurance matrix to the rank-and-file
police officers.
The arbitrator adopted the union’s
offer. The arbitrator found that both
parties were trying to establish a level
in internal parity: the union was
trying for parity with the rank-andfile police unit while the village was
trying for parity with other village
employee groups. The arbitrator found
that it was more reasonable for the
police command unit to have parity
with the rank-and-file unit than with
other employees of the village.95
10. City of Harvard and Illinois
Fraternal Order of Police Labor
Council96
The union representing the city’s
police officers and police sergeants
filed for interest arbitration. The
issues advanced to arbitration included health insurance.
The union proposed no changes to
the contribution levels (20 percent),
deductibles or the benefit plan. The
city proposed a new health plan that
would not change contribution levels,
but had premiums that would save
those opting for single coverage $820
each year compared to the plan
proposed by the union and save $1,700
each year for those opting for single
plus spouse coverage and $2,629 per
year for those opting for family
covrage. The city’s plan, however, had
increased deductibles, increased copays for prescription drugs and
greater out-of-pocket exposure.97
The arbitrator adopted the city’s
final offer. The arbitrator noted that
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the plan proposed by the city had been
imposed on non-union employees and
accepted by the public works’ union.
The city’s premium costs were the
highest among the comparables and
the arbitrator found that the annual
savings of $87,000 to the city would
offset some of the salary increases
sought by the union which cost just
over $100,000.98
11. City of Danville and PB&PA
Labor Committee, Inc./Danville Police Command Offices Association99
The union representing the city’s
police sergeants and lieutenants/
commanders filed for interest arbitration. The issues advanced to arbitration included health insurance.
The city maintained a self-funded
health insurance plan and in lieu of
paying monthly premiums to purchase traditional health insurance
coverage, the city made a monthly
“escrow” payment to cover employee
and family medical expenses. The
amount escrowed was based upon
claim experience and risk factors. The
city had been experiencing doubledigit increases.100
The union proposed no changes to
its contributions of $45 per month for
single coverage and $55 per month for
family coverage. The city proposed to
increase employee contributions $10
per month, commencing in the second
year of the contract, with another
increase of $10 per month in the third
year of the contract.101
The arbitrator found in favor of the
city. Converting the dollars to a
percentage of the total costs, the
arbitrator noted that the union’s
proposal would decrease the employee’s
rate of contribution while the city’s
proposal would only slightly increase
the employee’s rate of compensation
(by .05 percent).102 The arbitrator
found that the city’s offer was more
reasonable because the increased
contributions were de minimus by any
standard. The arbitrator made no
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references to any particular statutory
factor.103

B. Other Cases
Six of the seventeen interest arbitration awards issued over the past two
years that addressed the issue of
health insurance contributions do not
reveal the difficult task facing
arbitrators over choosing between the
final offers of parties and their
competing interests regarding paying
for health insurance coverage. In
County of Ogle and the Sheriff of Ogle
County and Illinois Fraternal Order
of Police Labor Council,104 three
separate units — a unit of deputies, a
unit of corrections officers, and a unit
of corporals and sergeants — consolidated their arbitration demands before
a single neutral arbitrator. The case
does not offer general insights into the
process of selecting competing health
insurance proposals because there was
a tentative agreement, which was
pivotal in the determination made by
the arbitrator.
Four cases involved stipulated
awards and thus offer no insights into
arbitral selection of competing offers.105 In City of Chicago and
Fraternal Order of Police, Chicago
Lodge No. 7,106 pursuant to alternative impasse procedures adopted by the
parties, the arbitrator was authorized
to deviate from the economic final
offers submitted to him, if he was
convinced that such deviation produced the most reasonable result. In
fact, the arbitrator did just that
regarding wages rates and premium
contributions to health insurance.
Consequently, the case is of limited
value in examining how arbitrators
choose between competing offers. The
results in this arbitration, much like
the stipulated interest arbitration
awards, were not arrived at under the
same considerations and restrictions
present in a normal interest arbitration.
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V. Conclusions
From the outset it should be noted that
it is difficult to grasp with any
confidence “trends in interest arbitration awards” if the focus is on results.
It is easy to see trends in how
arbitrators deal with procedural
issues (such as dealing with the scope
of supplemental hearings, applying
and weighing particular statutory
criteria, and the import of rejected
tentative agreements), but arbitration
results have so many independent
influences that it can be very difficult
to spot trends. For example, an
arbitrator will likely buck a “trend” if
he/she encounters a final offer that is
out of the realm of reason. Furthermore, a party wanting to be “trendy”
will have difficulty overcoming poor
lawyering (as manifested by, for
example, incomplete evidence, badlyconstructed comparables, and incompetent arguments) or consecrated
historical parities.
Nevertheless, the cases summarized above provide not only insight as
to how arbitrators are dealing with the
issue of allocating rising health
insurance premium costs, but also a
glimpse of a growing trend in interest
arbitration. The trend seems relatively obvious: interest arbitrators
are not abandoning traditional
interest arbitration analysis or
altering the weight attached to any
statutory factors when confronting
whether proposed increases to employee health insurance premium
contribution rates should be awarded.
The cases reveal that interest
arbitrators place a heavy emphasis on
internal and external comparability
when determining which offer regarding health insurance is more reasonable and are reluctant to agree to
“breakthrough” changes in insurance
language. In short, interest arbitrators are treating the issue of health
insurance as they treat, and have
treated other economic issues.
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Thus, arbitrators have rejected
“breakthroughs.” Arbitrator Benn
rejected the union’s effort to eliminate
unfavorable language because of
traditional arbitral notions that
support the status quo in Lee County.
Similarly, in Mt. Vernon, Arbitrator
Malin rejected the employer’s effort to
change existing contribution levels
where the employer relied upon the
notion of “national trends” as opposed
to statutory factors such as internal
and/or external comparability. In both
cases, the losing party sought changes
because the “bargain” it had struck
suddenly became unfavorable due to
the increasing costs associated with
health insurance. Rather than make
an exception in arbitration analysis
for changes in the health insurance
industry, the arbitrators applied the
statutory factors in a predictable and
traditional manner to reach their
results.
Similarly, Arbitrator Briggs rejected the notion that interest
arbitration is the forum to adopt
unique and novel changes to a
contractual benefit in Wilmette.
Although Arbitrator Briggs found the
union’s offer intriguing, he applied
traditional arbitral caselaw and
rejected the idea that a breakthrough
of a novel idea should be imposed
through interest arbitration rather
than agreed upon at the bargaining
table.
Where changes were adopted by
arbitrators, the reasoning was obvious
and supported by traditional statutory
factors. Arbitrator Benn adopted
changes to the health insurance
contribution levels in Effingham
County, where the changes were
identical with other internal employee
groups and the cost of living supported
the minimal increase of a 5 percent
contribution that he awarded. Similarly, in Bolingbrook, arbitrator Cox
adopted a union’s offer for increasing
contributions which were supported
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by internal comparables and in
Harvard, he adopted an employer’s
offer for increasing out of pocket costs
which was supported by internal and
external comparables.
Where both parties proposed changes
to existing health insurance contributions, by arbitrators measured the
appropriate offer based upon the
statutory criteria. Arbitrator Krinsky
adopted the city’s offer in Elgin, where
the external and internal comparables
supported the decision. Arbitrator
Yaffe adopted the city’s proposed
changes in Pekin, where the internal
comparables supported the city’s offer
and the external comparables supported neither party.
Where extreme changes to existing
health insurance contributions were
being proposed, arbitrators refused to
adopt them and instead chose the
lesser of two evils. Arbitrator Kossoff
agreed to reduce health insurance
contributions for single coverage
where the alternative was to impose
extraordinary increases to existing
contributions that were in conflict
with external comparables in
Highwood. Similarly, in Carpentersville, Arbitator Cox adopted the
union’s final offer where the employer
overreached in seeking employee
contributions at levels that were not
supported by the external comparables.
These cases reveal that despite the
health insurance crisis that employers
and employees have encountered, the
interest arbitration system has not
yielded different results. The arbitrators in these cases were not blind to the
crisis and, in fact, many commented
on it. Arbitrator Benn remarked,
“Insurance is presently a nightmare
and at a crisis level for employers,
employees and unions . . .”107
Arbitrator Yaffe remarked:
While the undersigned recognizes
that this award will have significant adverse economic consequences on unit employees, there
appears to be little choice but to
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spread the pain that both employers and employees are experiencing in trying to cope with the
problems both groups are having
in trying to maintain the kinds of
medical insurance coverage that
have traditionally been provided
employees by their employers.108
Nevertheless, despite these ominous observations, arbitrators are not
making exceptions in their analysis
when examining the appropriateness
of final offers regarding health
insurance contributions. The decisions in these cases do not reveal a
different analysis from the cases that
preceded them in the previous twenty
years. Despite the extreme changes in
the health insurance industry, the
statutory factors found in Section 14 of
the IPRLA have not changed and
arbitrators are not changing the
application of these factors.
There appears to be one exception
to this conclusion. In Danville,
Arbitrator Larney increased the level
of employee contributions without any
specific reference to internal
comparables, external comparables,
resisting breakthroughs or deference
to the status quo in his analysis.
Although it is not clear from the award
what arguments were advanced by the
union defending against the proposed
increases or the city advocating these
increases, the crux of his explanation
for increasing the employee contributions was that the city’s offer was more
reasonable than the union’s offer to
maintain the current contribution
levels.109
Granted, the adoption by an interest
arbitrator of the more reasonable
proposal is not earth-shattering;
rather, such a conclusion is to be
expected (and usually advocated) by
the litigants. However, Danville
stands as the only one among these
cases that does not mention of
particular statutory factors (e.g.,
comparability, etc.) in its analysis of
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whether increasing health insurance
premiums is a reasonable offer — other
than a passing reference that his
determination complied with the
factors in Section 14(h) of the IPLRA.
Interestingly, the Arbitrator’s analysis of the other two issues in the
arbitration included specific references to comparability and breakthroughs.

VI. Final Thoughts
The “trend” found in these cases is
perhaps best described as the absence
of panic. After twenty years of
experience in Illinois interest arbitration, the process has evolved but not
stumbled under the pressures of the
overwhelming health insurance nightmare. Public employers, essential
service employees and unions have a
predictable procedure for resolving
bargaining impasses. Even an unparalleled explosion in health care costs
failed to wreck the system.
Management and union advocates
certainly have their own preferences
and ideas as to how the interest
arbitration process could be changed
for the better. However, the present
system certainly cannot be faulted for
a lack of durability or consistency. X
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Recent
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Recent Developments is a regular
feature of The Illinois Public Employee
Relations Report. It highlights recent
legal developments of interest to the
public employment relations community. This issue focuses on developments under the two collective
bargaining statutes.

IELRA Developments
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accordance with the State Employee
Group Insurance Act, 5 ILCS 375/1.
However, the IELRB observed, under
the Insurance Act, the university was
allowed to set the amount of premiums
and the amount of member contributions. The IELRB concluded that CMS
played no role in any of the Ohrenic
factors and, accordingly, was not a
joint employer.
Member Ettinger dissented. He
argued that the Insurance Act
required CMS to offer insurance
benefits to union-represented employees
through
their
unions.
Consequentely, in his view, the
Insurance Act made CMS a joint
employer.

Joint Employers
In Service Employees International
Union, Local 73 v. University of
Illinois at Chicago and Illinois
Department of Central Management
Services, No’s 2005-CA-0006-C; 2005CA-0001-S (IELRB 2005) the IELRB
held that University of Illinois at
Chicago (UIC) and Illinois Department of Central Management Services
(CMS) were not joint employers and
therefore dismissed the portion of the
charges that related to CMS.
The IELRB viewed the key
consideration in determining employer status as the extent to which an
entity is necessary to create an
effective bargaining relationship. In
addition, as set out in Orenic, v.
ISLRB, 127 Ill.2d 453, 537 N.E. 2d 784
(1989), other relevant factors for
determining joint employer status are
whether both employers have the
power to hire and fire; promote and
demote; and set wages, work hours,
and other terms and conditions of
employment.
The union argued that CMS, was a
joint employer because it established
employees’ group life and health
insurance plan benefits and costs in
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resolve impasses in bargaining for
initial and successor collective bargaining agreements, but does not
provide for arbitration of mid-term
bargaining impasses. The ILRB,
however, relied on section 2’s provision
that “all collective bargaining disputes
involving . . . security employees shall
be submitted to” interest arbitration.
The board reasoned that the IPLRA
was not intended to shift the balance of
power in favor of employers in midterm bargaining with employees who
lacked the right to strike. Therefore
the act affords those employees
“alternate, expeditious, equitable and
effective procedure for the resolution of
labor disputes” via interest arbitration, The board concluded that the
ILPRA requires interest arbitration
for mid-term disputes.

Interest Arbitration
In AFSCME, Council 31 and State of
Illinois, Department of Central Management Services, No. S-CA-03-002 et
al (ILRB State Panel 2005) the State
Panel held that security employees
and other employees who are prohibited from striking have a right to
interest arbitration to resolve midterm disputes. The ILRB rejected the
state’s argument that interest arbitration was limited to disputes over an
initial or successor contract. Therefore the state was required to arbitrate
issues related to a facility closing that
were negotiated mid-term to impasse.
This issue arose after the state
announced that it was closing several
correctional facilities. The parties
negotiated the impact of the closings.
They agreed on some issues, but others
were negotiated to impasse. AFSCME
demanded interest arbitration and the
state refused on the ground that there
was no obligation to arbitrate.
The state argued that there was no
duty to arbitrate because section 14(a)
of the IPLRA provides for mediation
followed by interest arbitration to
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Subjects of Bargaining
In Libertyville Professional Firefighters Association and Village of
Libertyville, No. S-CA-05-045 (ILRB
State Panel 2005), the State Panel held
that promotion to the rank immediately above the highest rank in a
firefigher bargaining unit is a
mandatory subject of bargaining. The
board determined the union’s proposal
on the issue of promotions to fire
lieutenant concerned a mandatory
subject of bargaining under the
recently-enacted FireDepartment Promotions Act (FDPA), 50 ILCS 742/1.
The empoyer was directed to bargain
with the union with respect to that
proposal.
The ILRB acknowledged that case
law had previously held that promotions to non-bargaining unit positions
were not mandatorily negotiable.
Village of Franklin Park, 8 PERI ¶ 2039
(ISLRB 1992), aff’d, 265 Ill.App.3d
997, 638 N.E. 2d 1144 (3d Dist. 1994);
City of Chicago, 15 PERI ¶ 3010 (ILRB
1999).
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The board observed that the FDPA
defines “promotion” to encompass
advancement to ranks within a
bargaining unit and to the rank
immediately above the highest rank in
the unit. Furthermore, the FDPA
provides that it sets a “minimum
standard” and is to “be construed to
authorize and not to limit” bargaining
over promotions. The board reasoned
that this statutory language could
only be interpreted to mandate
bargaining and that any other
interpretation would render the
FDPA’s language meaningless.
Member Hernandez dissented. He
argued that the word “authorize”
meant allow, rather than mandate.
Consequently, he would have held that
promotions outside the bargaining
unit remained a permissive subject of
X
bargaining.
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ian, Institute of Labor and Industrial
Relations Library, University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
Reese, Laura A. & Lindenberg,
Karen, E. GENDER, AGE, AND
SEXUAL HARASSMENT. REVIEW OF PUBLIC PERSONNEL
ADMINISTRATION. Vol. 25, no.
4. December 2005. pp.325-352.
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and also if there are significant
relationships between age and gender
in terms of evaluating sexual
harassment policies at work. Previous
research has reported how female and
male employees interpreted sexual
harassment policies and how they
approached cases differently. This
research confirms that age also is an
important factor that shapes public
employees’ attitudes toward and
satisifaction with sexual harassment
policies.

McDonnell, Kenneth J. & Salisbury,
Dallas. BENEFIT COST COMPARISONS BETWEEN STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
AND PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYERS. PUBLIC PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT. Vol. 34,
no. 4. Winter 2005. pp. 321-327.
This article examines the total
compensation discrepancy between
public and private sector employers.
The data released by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics in 2005 reported that
total compensation costs (salaries and
wages and employee benefits) were
higher for state and local government
employers than for private sector
employers (40% higher for salaries and
wages and 61% higher for employee
benefits). The authors seek to offer
further insights in understanding the
higher compensation costs for public
sector employers compared to private
sector employers.

The authors conducted a survey of 525
municipal employees to study their
attitudes based on gender and age
groups toward sexual harassment
policies. The authors were specifically
interested in investigating if age
groups differences are equally important for male and female employees,
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Haraway, William M. EMPLOYEE
GRIEVANCE PROGRAMS:
UNDERSTANDING THE
NEXUS BETWEEN WORKPLACE JUSTICE, ORGANIZATIONAL LEGITIMACY AND
SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATIONS. PUBLIC PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT. Vol. 34, no. 4.
Winter 2005. pp. 329-342.
This article explores issues of
workplace justice and organization
legitimacy founded in formal employee
grievance programs and procedures
designed to afford aggrieved employees
procedural due process, equal treatment and fairness. The author
contends that workplace justice and
organization success are closely tied to
the legitimate actions of first-line
supervisors and human resource
management’s abilities to design
institutions capable of fulfilling their
social responsibilities in self-serving
ways. This will require a better
understanding of how formal employee
grievance procedures alter cooperative, alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms for resolving employees’
workplace concerns, complaints, and
disputes in public organizations.
[Publication Abstract]

(Books and articles anotated in
Further References are available on
interlibary loan through ILLINET by
contacting your local public library or
system headquarters.)
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